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use#LAABEYOND  BIOLOGY:  THE  POLITICS OF ADOPTION  &
REPRODUCTION
ELZABETH  BARTHOLET
It  is  exciting  simply  to  be having  this  conference  focused  on adoption
law  and policy.  I  remember  some  nine  years  ago  starting  to plan  a  course
dealing  with  adoption  issues  and  wondering  whether  I  would  be  able  to
justify its place  in the Harvard  Law  School  curriculum.  It is  also  exciting to
look  around  the room at  the wonderfully  diverse  and knowledgeable  group
of  people  the  Duke Journal of Gender Law  & Policy gathered  here  to partici-
pate  in  these  discussions  of  important  issues  involving  adoption  and  the.
meaning  of family.
My  topic  today  has to  do with adoption  and,  more particularly,  adop-
tion  in  relation  to  reproduction.  By  reproduction  I  mean  three  different
things:  (1)  traditional  reproduction,  or  the  production  of  a  child  through
normal  intercourse  between  one  man  and  one  woman;  (2)  infertility  treat-
ment,  or  the  use  of  medical  technology  to  assist  a  man  and  a  woman  to
produce  a child  using his  sperm  and her egg  and womb;  and  (3) a variety
of  child  producing  and  parenting  arrangements  that  I  have  collectively
termed "technologic  adoption."  By the latter, I mean  arrangements that result
in  the  social  equivalent  of  either  step-parent  adoptions  or  full  adoptions,
where  the  child is  produced  in  order  to  be raised  by  one  or more  parents
who  will  not  be  genetically  or biologically  related.  I  am  referring  to  such
practices  as  donor  insemination,  surrogacy,  both  in  its  "traditional"  and
gestational  form,  egg  donation  or  sale,  and  embryo  donation  or  sale.  One
thing  I find interesting  about  these  arrangements  is  that while  they  do pro-
duce  the  social  equivalent  of  traditional  adoption,  they  do  not  involve  the
legal process  required  for such adoption-hence  my term, technologic  adop-
tion.
"Defining  Family"  is  the  title  of  this  conference.  Adoption  and  repro-
ductive  technology  have  in common  a tendency  to push  us  to  define  fami-
ly-to decide  what we  want family  to be.  Typically,  we  think  of family  as
meaning a man and a woman raising  their bio-product  child. But both tradi-
tional  adoption  and  non-traditional  reproductive  techniques  make  it  clear
that  this  definition  of  family  is  a  matter  of choice-it  is not  determined  by
nature.  When birth  parents  choose  to  turn  the  child  they  produce  over  to
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others  to  raise,  we  call  that  new parent-child  grouping  an adoptive  family.
With  the  help  of sperm  banks,  surrogacy  brokers,  and  in vitro  fertilization
(IVF)  clinics,  men  and  women  can  contribute  their  sperm,  eggs,  and  other
child-bearing  services  to  create  a  child  for  others  to  raise.  Increasingly,  we
encourage  such arrangements  by permitting commercial  contracts  and calling
the newly  created  social  unit  a  family.
If  we  recognize  that  family  is  not  necessarily  defined  and  limited  by
biology, we have  to  think about some  fundamental  questions.  One has to  do
with  the  significance  of  a  biological  link  between  parent  and  child-is  it
essential,  or important,  or  not at  all important?  Another has  to  do with the
concept  of parenting--is  it essential,  or  important,  or not at  all important  to
have  there be  two parents,  one  of each sex?
It is  a  cliche that  we  live in  an era  when  the  traditional understanding
of  family  is  breaking  open.  Although  we  still  talk  as  if family  means  the
husband-wife-child  nuclear  unit, we  know that  today  the actual  meaning  of
family  for  many  people  is  the  step-parent  version  of  the  extended  family.
We  also  know  that  roughly  half  our  children  spend  a  significant  part  of
their  childhood  in single parent households, and that grandparents  are  doing
the  only  actual  parenting  many  children  ever  receive.  We  know  that  al-
though  laws  used  to  forbid  marriage  and sex  across  racial  lines,  interracial
marriages  have  risen  dramatically  in  the  last  two  decades,  as  has  the  inci-
dence  of mixed-race births.'
Recent  headlines in the newspapers  demonstrate  how reproductive  tech-
nologies  are  raising  a  spate  of new  questions  about  the meaning  of  family.
Do  men  have  abortion  rights?  The  Supreme  Court  of  Tennessee  held  that
they  do  in  a  case  involving  a  custody  battle over  frozen  IVF  embryos.2  Do
post-menopausal  women  have  a  right  to  bear  children?  Increasingly,  IVF
clinics  are  serving  such  women  through  the  use  of donor/vendor  eggs.  The
media recently  featured  two examples  of such  "miracle  pregnancies,"  involv-
ing one woman in her late  fifties  and  another  in her early  sixties.
Doctors  are  engaged  in radical  experiments  with the production  of hu-
man  life  that  challenge  us  as  a society  to  decide what, if any, commitments
we  have  to  "the  traditional"  or  "the  natural"  in connection  with the  begin-
nings  of life and family. Doctors  have recently  shocked  the nation by reveal-
ing  their  success in cloning,  or twinning,  a human  IVF embryo.  In Japan,  an
embryonic  goat  is  coming  to  term  in  an  artificial  womb.  You  can  be  sure
that the  doctors  are  thinking  about  the  possibilities  for bringing human  em-
bryos  to term  without  the need  for a  human womb.  We  have  recently  read
that scientists  are  hard  at  work  on  a  project  designed  to  enable  an  aborted
female  fetus  to  function  as  an  egg  mother:  the  idea  is  to  implant  the  fetal
eggs  in  an  adult  woman  who  cannot  produce  eggs,  enabling  her  to  give
birth to  a child whose  genetic  mother will never have  lived.
Technologic  adoption  practices  involve  the abandonment  of ideas about
family  that  have  traditionally  been  considered  central.  These  practices  en-
courage  men  and women  to  surrender  their sperm and  eggs,  their  embryos,
1.  Jill  Smolowe,  Intermarried . . . With  Children, TIME,  Fall  1993  Special  Issue,  at  64.
2.  Davis  v.  Davis,  842  S.W.2d  588,  604  (Tenn. 1992).
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and even their children  to  others for whatever  fee is necessary  to encourage
the surrender.  Men  are  typically  paid  for their  sperm and  women  for  their
eggs in  what  doctors  like  to  call  sperm  donation  and  egg donor  programs.
Surrogate  mothers  are paid  to surrender the children  they bear.  IVF patients
are encouraged  to donate some of their embryos  for use by other patients by
a variety of methods  including, in some programs,  agreements  to reduce  the
cost  of  the  "donor"  patients'  treatment.  As  these  transactions  become  more
common  and acceptable, we seem  to be jettisoning  the notion that a biologic
link is central  to the parenting  relationship.
Technologic  adoption  also  opens parenting opportunities  to  a variety  of
non-traditional  parent  types-to  single,  lesbian,  gay,  and  older  prospective
parents,  for  example.  Straight  single  women,  lesbian  singles,  and  couples
have  made  increasing  use  of  donor  insemination  as  a  route  to  parenting.
Gay  men  now  look  to  surrogacy  as  providing  them  with  equivalent
parenting  opportunities  in the future.
In  addition  to  expanding  the  categories  of  people  who  are  eligible  for
parenthood, reproductive  technology is also being used to reinforce tradition-
al  ideas  of  family.  Infertile  couples  are  encouraged  to  invest  ever  more  of
their  lives  in  high  tech  treatment  designed  to  enable  them  to  produce  the
procreative  child  of  their  dreams.  Donor  insemination  and  surrogacy  are
generally  designed  to  provide  couples  with  a  look-alike  substitute  for  the
child they were unable  to produce.
Traditional  adoption  practices  represent  a  similar  study  in  contrasts,
simultaneously  reinforcing and breaking  away from traditional  ideas of fami-
ly.  Adoption  by definition  breaks  away  from the  traditional  idea  of  family,
since it involves  the transfer of a child  from its birth parents  to new parents
with whom  there  is  no  biological  link. At  the same  time,  adoption  law  re-
inforces  the  significance  of biologically  linked  parenting. Virtually  all  adop-
tion regulation  takes  a negative  or  restrictive  character,  reflecting  the under-
lying premise  that the  transfer  of  a  child  from birth  to  adoptive  parents  is
an  inherently  risky  proposition.  Thus,  adoption  regulation  is  for  the  most
part designed either  to protect birth parents and children  from being wrong-
fully  separated  from  each  other,  or  to  protect  children  from being  placed
with  unfit  or  otherwise  inappropriate  adoptive  parents.  There  is  almost  no
adoption regulation  that  takes  a  positive  or  facilitative  form  to  ensure  that
children in need  of homes receive  them at the earliest possible  time.?
If you  look  at  the way in  which  adoption regulation  attempts  to  shape
the  adoptive  family,  you  again  see  the  law  reinforcing  traditional  notions
about family. The sealed  record  tradition  creates  the new adoptive  family  in
the  image  of  the  traditional  nuclear  family,  with  one  set  of  parents  only.
3.  The  proposed  Uniform Adoption  Act,  UNIF.  ADOPTION  AcT  (1994),  and  the Multiethnic
Placement  Act,  Howard  M.  Metzenbaum  Multiethnic  Placement  Act  of  1994,  Pub.  L.  No.  103-
382,  §§  551-54,  108 Stat.  3518, 4056-57  (1994)  (to be codified  at 42  U.S.C.  §5115a  (1994)),  stand
as  limited  exceptions  to  this  general  principle.  The  Uniform  Act  has  numerous  provisions
designed  to  facilitate  the  adoption  process.  The  Multiethnic  Placement  Act  prohibits  agencies
that receive  federal  funds  from  using  race  to  delay or  deny adoptive  placements.
For  more  discussion  about  transracial  adoption,  see  relevant  articles  in  2  DUKE  J. GEN-
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Sealing  the  records  effectively  eliminates  the  existence  of  the birth  parents,
preventing  adoptees  from  finding  out who  they  are and from being  discov-
ered  by  them.  Furthermore,  the  parental  screening  system  is  designed  to
select  adoptive parents who  fit  a traditional  parenting  profile. Ranked  at  the
top  of  the adoption  agencies'  prospective  parent lists  are  husband-wife  cou-
ples of child-bearing  age who  obey  the  social rules-they go to church,  they
do  not  marry  across  religious  or  racial  lines,  and  they  stay  married  long
enough  to  demonstrate  marital  stability.  The  system  for  matching  waiting
children with prospective parents  is  also designed  to create adoptive  families
that  fit  the  social  and  biological  norm  of  family.  Rules  often  limit  older
adopters  to  children  of  an  age  comparable  to  the  age  their  biological  chil-
dren  would have been. In earlier  times, rules required that parents and chil-
dren  be  matched  for looks  so that  the adoptive  family  could pretend  to the
world that  it was  in fact  a  "natural"  family. Rules  still require  matching  for
race,  preventing  children  of  color  from  finding  homes  with white  parents
even if the only alternative  is placing  the children in foster care  limbo.4
The  reality  of  adoption  today  flies  in  the  face  of the  law's  traditional
bent.  Large  numbers  of  birth  and  adoptive  parents  are  finding  their  way
through  and  around  the law  to  form  the kinds  of families  they  want. Their
efforts  are  facilitated  by  the  private  adoption  system,  which  operates  free
from  much  of  the  restrictive  regulation  that  shapes  the  public  adoption
world.  As  a  result, there  is  increasing  "openness"  between  birth  and  adop-
tive  families.  They  may  exchange  identifying  information,  send  letters  and
photographs on an on-going basis,  meet with  each other, and even engage  in
regular visitation.  Thus, significant  numbers  of adoptive  families  are  experi-
menting  with  variations  on  the  theme  of  the  closed  nuclear  family.  Also,
non-traditional  parent  types  are  finding  their  way  through  the  adoption
maze  in  increasing  numbers  despite  the bias  against  them.  Single,  lesbian,
gay, and  older  adopters  are  managing  to  parent through  adoption,  whether
by  agreeing  to  take  the  older, hard-to-place  children  from the  public  agen-
cies,  or by pursuing  private  or international  adoption.  And  adoptive  parents
are  forming  families  across  racial,  cultural,  and  national  lines,  despite  the
strong regulatory  restrictions  on such adoption.
This  conflict  between  the law  and the reality  of adoption  represents,  to
a  significant  degree,  a  conflict  between  the  law  and  popular will-at  least
the will of  those adults  directly  involved  in adoptive  arrangements.  It raises
the question  whether  traditional  adoption law  is  good  or bad  in attempting
to  restrict  and  limit  private  desires  in  matters  related  to  the  formation  of
families  and  the rearrangement  of parenting  responsibilities.
It could  be a good thing  to flout  private  will in order,  for example, to
protect  children  who  will  not  be  able  to  protect  themselves  in  a  private
4.  See, Elizabeth  Bartholet,  Where  Do  Black Children  Belong?  The Politics  of Race Matching in
Adoption, 139  U.  PA.  L.  REv.  1163  (1991).
The  Multiethnic  Placement  Act,  supra  note  3,  is  designed  to  limit  race  matching
practices,  prohibiting  the  use  of  race  to  delay  or deny  foster  or  adoptive  placement.  The  Act
does, however,  specifically  permit  agencies  to  use  race  as  a  factor  in  making  placement deci-
sions.
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contract  regime.  Thus,  in  my view  we  need  more  in the  way  of  restrictive
regulatory  law  in  the  realm  of  reproductive  technology,  which  currently
operates  in a free market  regime.  I  think that  the state  has  a role to  play in
this  area  in  protecting  the  vulnerable  from  exploitation  and  oppression and
in making certain vital  "family"  decisions. We should not be leaving  entirely
to doctors and other private parties  decisions about what kind of experimen-
tation  with  human  embryos  is  appropriate,  what  kind  of  eugenics  will  be
allowed  through the aid of reproductive  technology, whether  genetic material
and  childbearing  services  should  be  commercialized,  and whether  sex  selec-
tion  should be systematically  practiced.
Restrictive  adoption regulation might be justified  by the goal of protect-
ing  children's  best  interests  or  by  other  valid  societal  concerns  about  the
shape of  the family. But in my view, current adoption law  is not justified. I
believe  that  this  law  systematically  hurts  children,  although  it  is  almost  al-
ways  rationalized  as  serving  children's  best  interests.  We  live  in  a  world
with millions on millions of children  who  are  in desperate need  of a nurtur-
ing  home.  If  we  really  cared  about  children's  interests,  we  would  design
adoption  law  to  facilitate  the placement  of  these  children  with people  who
could provide the parenting  they need. Existing adoption law instead  creates
barriers  that  effectively prevent  these  children  from finding  homes.
I also  see current  adoption law,  in combination  with reproductive  poli-
cies,  as  systematically  hurting  women  generally,  and  infertile  women  in
particular.  We  induce  infertile  women  to  spend  ever  more  of  their  lives
pursuing  infertility  treatment,  and  we  drive  them  away  from  adoptive
parenting.  We  do  this by  glorifying  procreation  and childbirth,  while  at the
same time stigmatizing infertility  and adoption.  We do it by allowing repro-
ductive  technology  to  operate  in  the  free  market,  while  at  the  same  time
creating  a  restrictive  regulatory  regime  in  the  adoption  area.  And we  do  it
by subsidizing  procreation through health  insurance, tax  laws, and employer
benefit packages,  while at the same  time  making adoptive  parents pay every
step  of the way  for the adoption costs  created  by restrictive regulation.
The  cult of  fertility  and childbearing  that is  at  the heart  of  these  com-
bined  policies  represents  a  profoundly  limiting  and confining  vision  of the
role  of.  women. Ultimately,  these policies  may deny  many women what they
most  want-the  parenting  experience.  Even  repeated,  technologically-ad-
vanced medical  treatment  will  often  fail  to overcome  the  infertility  problem.
By  contrast, adoption could easily  satisfy both the adult's need to parent and
the  child's  need  to be  parented,  if only  the law  were  designed  to facilitate,
rather  than impede, the process.
Finally,  I see  adoption law  as hurting  society  more broadly.  We live in
a  world  that  has  no need  for  more  people.  We  are  rapidly  destroying  our
environment because of  our  inability  to handle  the people we  already  have.
It seems crazy  to  drive those  who  want  to parent away  from already  exist-
ing  children  who  need  homes  and  into  the production  of new  children.  To
the degree  that  society's  adoption rules  are designed  to reinforce  traditional
notions  of  family,  they  are not accomplishing  the  goal because  of  our com-
mitment  to a  free market regime  in the reproductive  area. It makes  no sense
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and white  adults  are  choosing  to marry  and  procreate  across  racial  lines.  It
also makes no  sense  to discourage single, lesbian, gay, and older prospective
parents  from  adopting  when  they  are  free  to  reproduce  and,  indeed,  the
reproductive  industries are encouraging  them to do so. The net impact is not
to  reinforce  traditional  notions  of  family,  but  simply  to  push  people  who
want  to parent  away  from  adopting  the children  in need  of  homes  and  to-
ward  producing  new  ones,  through  means  which  may  constitute  the  social
equivalent  of adoption.
The  politics of adoption and reproduction  are, to me, both puzzling  and
problematic.  As  I have criss-crossed  the country  during the past year, speak-
ing to various  audiences  and to the media, I have  been struck by  the loneli-
ness  of my position  as  adoption  advocate.  My  pro-adoption  pitch  seems  to
me  innately  appealing.  I  would  think  that  there  would  be widespread  con-
cern with the way in which the law now  structures adoption as a last resort.
I would think there would be general  agreement on the irrationality  of social
policy  that  drives  people  away  from  giving homes  to  kids who  need  them
in  order  to  create  more kids  in a world  that  cannot  handle  those  it already
has-social  policy  that restricts  traditional  adoption,  while  at the same  time
enabling and encouraging  people  to engage in technologic  adoption.
I  would  also  think  that  there  would  at least  be  significant  support  in
many  quarters  for my more radical  position that adoption should  be seen  as
a  positive  alternative  family  form.  Social  policy  is  premised  in  part  on  an
assumption  that adoption's  differences  are  necessarily  and  inherently  nega-
tive  differences-that  only  to the degree  that  adoptive  families  can  look like
the  norm  of  family  can  they  be  good.  But  many  of  us  who  live  adop-
tion-are  part of an adoptive  family--experience  the  differences  as  positive.5
It seems at least worth  thinking about ways  in which  it might be positive to
have  a  family  defined  by  social  relationship  rather  than  biology,  in  which
children have more  than one set  of parent figures, and in which  parent-child
relationships  cross genetic,  racial,  and national lines.
Yet  the status quo  is  a profoundly  anti-adoption  and pro-natalist  status
quo.  Powerful  political  forces  are  pushing  for  policies  that  would  make
adoption  even more  of  a last resort,  policies  that  would make  biology even
more  important  to the  definition  of family.  There  seems  to be an  increasing
sense  that  children  "belong"  in  some  fundamental  sense  to their birth  fami-
lies and to their  racial  and national groups of origin. One  of the most active
forces  for  change  in  adoption  policy  is  the  search  movement,  which  advo-
cates  for  greater  access  to  birth  records.  Its  most  vocal  leaders  speak  the
language  of  biological  determinism  and  argue  for  the  essential  quality  of
biological  parent-child  links.  Characterizing  adoption  as  an  inherently  ex-
ploitative,  abusive  arrangement,  they  take  the  position  that  birth  parent
rights  should never  be severed.  They call  for an end to the legal form adop-
tion  takes  today,  arguing  that  in those  last  resort  situations  in  which  chil-
dren  absolutely  must  be  removed  from  their  parents,  they  should be  placed
with permanent  guardians rather  than adoptive  parents.
5.  The  author  has  two  adopted  children,  both  born  in  Lima,  Peru.
Volume  2:5  1995BEYOND  BIOLoGY  11
Racial  matching advocates  espouse a  related  kind of racial  determinism,
arguing  that black children  can  only  realize  their true identity when  part  of
the  black  community.6  These  advocates  have  been  extremely  successful  in
preventing  the transracial placement  of children waiting for adoptive  homes.
People  talk  of  a burgeoning  children's  rights  movement, and  it is  true
that  recent  adoption  scandals  like  the Jessica  DeBoer  case  have  triggered  a
general  concern  with  the  law's  deference  to  biologic  parent  rights  at  the
expense  of children's interests.  Despite  the media  attention to such  cases  and
popular  sympathy  with  the  adoptive  family  relationship,  policy  makers  in
this  country are overwhelmingly  committed  to family preservation  and fami-
ly  reunification.  The  Children's  Defense  Fund,  the Child  Welfare  League  of
America,  and  the  Clinton  Administration  have  tended  to equate  child  wel-
fare  with  biologic  family  preservation,  and  have  done  nothing  to promote
adoption  as a means  of guaranteeing  children's  rights  to  a nurturing home.
Left-leaning  political  forces-groups  styling  themselves  as  liberal,  pro-
gressive  or  feminist-tend  to be  either  hostile  to  adoption  or  silent  on  the
topic.  This  is  particularly  disturbing  to  me  both  because  I  see  myself  as
generally  aligned with, rather  than against, these groups, and because I think
that  they  are key  to effecting needed  change in  adoption policy.
I will touch briefly  on three  examples  that reflect  my concern  about  the
nature  of  left-leaning  politics  in  the  adoption  area.  The  first  involves  the
transracial  adoption  debate.  State  adoption  agency  policies  throughout  the
nation  require  that children  be matched with same-race  parents.  As  a result,
black  children  are  regularly held  for  months  and  years at a  time,  often  for
their entire  childhoods,  rather  than being placed with any  of the many  wait-
ing white  parents.  These  policies  are  clearly  damaging  to  children. The  evi-
dence  is overwhelming  that delay  or denial  of permanent  placement  injures
children both in the short and  the long term. At the same time, there  is not
a  shred  of  evidence  that  transracial  placement  poses  any  problem  for  the
children  involved.  Studies  show  that  transracial  adoptees  do  as  well  with
respect  to  every  measure  social scientists  use  in assessing human  happiness
and psychological  health  as  children  placed  in  same-race  homes.  Same-race
matching  policies  are in  clear violation  of the law, both adoption law, which
makes  children's  best interests  the governing  principle,  and race  law, which
prohibits  race-conscious  action  by the  state  except  in those  limited  instances
when  it can  be justified  as  legitimate  affirmative  action.  Why  then  do  we
have  these  policies?  We  have  these  policies  because  a  limited  number  of
black leaders  have  demanded  and promoted  them.  And we  have  these  poli-
cies  because  white  liberals  have  acquiesced,  and  because  the  organizations
that describe  themselves  as  the  friends  of children  and  of  civil  rights have
acquiesced.
My  second  example  involves  international  adoption.  Untold  millions  of
children  in  foreign  countries  live  in  desperate  need  for  a  nurturing  home.
Their only real-world alternative  to adoption is life or death on the streets or
in  orphanages.  The  opponents  of  international  adoption  argue  that  it  robs
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children  of  their  precious  cultural  heritage,  but  they  pay  little  attention  to
the limited opportunity  unadopted  children  will have  to enjoy that heritage.
Recent  political  moves  resulted in  closing  down  international  adoption pro-
grams  in Romania  and China  for significant  periods  of time. Although  pro-
grams in both countries  have  now opened  up again,  adoption law  reform in
Romania has  meant  severe  restrictions, limiting  the number  of children who
are  able  to  obtain  homes.  For  many  Romanian  children,  the  alternative  to
international  adoption  is  condemnation  to what  are  at  best cleaned-up  ver-
sions  of the  institutional  hellholes  that  were  revealed  to  the world with the
fall  of the  Communist regime.  In  China, ninety-eight  percent of  the children
available  for  adoption  are  girls.  The  temporary  close-down  of international
adoption  there  presumably  left  many  Chinese  children  to  the  fate  reserved
for  unwanted  baby  girls  in  China-death  at  birth  or  placement  in  an  or-
phanage,  where  death  rates are said  to range  from twenty to ninety percent.
The  politics  of international  adoption parallel  those  of  transracial  adop-
tion. They  were played  out in  the course  of  the Spring  1993  Hague  Confer-
ence negotiations  which  produced  a  draft Convention on intercountry  adop-
tion. 7  Various  organizations  describing  themselves  as  the friends  of  children
and defenders  of human  rights  took the position that  international  adoption
should be seen  as the enemy. They advocated  for its elimination. When they
were  unable  to accomplish  that, they  settled  for a convention  which created
significant  new  barriers  between  the  children  in  need  of  homes  and  the
parents  in foreign  countries  anxious for the opportunity  to adopt.
My  final example  involves the  feminist stance  on adoption.  Many femi-
nists  have  been  outspoken  in  their  criticism  of various  reproductive  tech-
nologies  and  of  surrogacy  arrangements.  But  feminists  have  been  largely
silent  on  the  topic  of  adoption,  and  some  have  spoken  out  against  it. For
example,  the  recent  edition  of  the  Boston  Women's  Health  Collective's  Our
Bodies Ourselves, takes  an extremely hostile position on adoption.'  The  advice
given to birth mothers is pure and simple:  abortion  is good, and adoption  is
bad. Adoption is bad because  it will lead  to lifelong  pain for the birth moth-
er and lifelong problems  for the child.  The book refers  those who want more
information  to  "thoughtful  professional  leaders"  who  turn  out  to  be  the
search  movement's  most  hostile-to-adoption  contingent.  It  includes  excerpts
from  their  writings  in which  they  argue  that  adoptive  relationships  are  in-
herently  abusive,  exploitative,  and  otherwise  problematic,  and  accordingly,.
that adoption should be eliminated  even  as a last-resort family  choice.
Why  this  combination  of hostility and  silence  from  feminists?  It is  un-
derstandable  that some feminists would react  against the anti-abortion forces'
apparent  embrace  of  adoption  as  the  preferred  alternative  to  abortion.  But
the thinking feminist should  be able  to  see  that the anti-abortion forces  have
in  fact  never  provided  significant  support  for  adoption.  They  have  for  the
7.  Hague  Conference  on  Private  International  Law:  Final  Act  of  the  17th  Session,  in-
cluding  the Convention  on Protection  of  Children  and  Co-Operation  in  Respect  of Intercountry
Adoption,  32  I.L.M.  1134  (1993).
8.  BOSTON  WOMEN'S  HEALTH BOOK  COLLECTIVE,  THE  NEW  OUR  BODIES,  OURsELVES:  A
BOOK  BY  AND  FOR  WOMEN  346-351  (1992).
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most part simply used adoption  as  a club with  which to beat  abortion rights
activists  over the head.  And to the degree  there  is some genuine  support for
adoption  among pro-life  groups,  that should  not  alone be  enough  to  make
adoption anathema  to pro-choice  feminists.
There  are  feminists  who  have  spoken  up  for  adoption,  and  some  of
them are  here at this  conference.  But why are  there  so  few?  It seems to me
to make  perfect feminist  sense  to  extend our understanding  of reproductive
rights  to  include  what  I  call  adoption  rights-the  birth  mother's  right  to
surrender  her  child  for others  to  raise,  the  infertile  woman's  right  to adopt
children  in need  of nurturing, and  the child's  right to  a home.
Why, more generally,  are the left-leaning political  forces aligned against,
rather  than for, adoption?  We need  to  know why in order  to begin  to think
about  how  to turn  things  around.  We need  to  understand  the current  poli-
tics  of adoption  in  order  to begin  to think  how  to shape  the politics  of  to-
morrow.
I  think  that  left-leaning  political  forces  oppose  adoption  because  they
see  it  as  inherently  exploitative.  The  exploitative  picture  is  easy  to  paint.
Adoption involves, generally speaking, the transfer of children  from the poor
and  disadvantaged  to the  relatively  well-off,  from  people  of  color  to  white
people,  from  Third  World  to  First  World  nations.  The  photograph  of  the
impoverished,  dark-skinned, single, Latin American woman handing over her
newborn  to the happy  white couple  who  have flown from the United States
to  take the child back  to their empty  nursery is  a poignant one.  While  there
is  truth to this picture,  it simultaneously represents  a fundamental  distortion
of reality.
Adoption has to  do with problems  of oppression  and disadvantage,  but
it  does  not  cause  those  problems.  And  to be  anti-adoption  does  nothing  to
solve  those  problems.  Anti-adoption  forces  talk  about  the  importance  of  a
poor country's holding onto its children, its "precious  resources,"  but the last
thing  most poor countries  actually need  is more poor children.
Nonetheless,  anti-adoption  rhetoric  constitutes  a  powerful  rallying  cry
for leaders  of the  oppressed. After  all, slave  holders in this  country  did take
black  children  from  their  birth  mothers,  and  First  World  countries  have
taken  precious  resources  from  Third  World  countries  over  the  centuries.
Furthermore,  anti-adoption  demands  are  winnable.  When  leaders  of the  op-
pressed  demand  "their  children"  on  behalf  of  their  community,  leaders  of
the more powerful  groups  and nations  may  actually  accede  to  the demand.
We  should  not  understand  this  as  an  act  of unusual  generosity  inspired  by
sudden  pangs  of conscience.  Children  have  no  choice;  their  interests  can  be
easily  sacrificed.  Anti-adoption  forces win  their battles  in the  name  of  serv-
ing  children's  interests  and  fighting  for  the  disempowered  against  the  ex-
ploitative powers  of the world. But no one should be fooled. It does  nothing
to  empower  the  disempowered  to  insist  that  single  birth  mothers  keep
"their"  children when  they are  in no position to raise them,  or to insist that
Third  World  nations  keep  "their"  children  when  it means  they  will  be des-
tined  to  live on the streets or in orphanages,  or to insist that the black  com-
munity  in  this  country  keep  "their"  children  when  it  means  they  will  be
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The  reality  is  that  adoption  is  used  as  a  scapegoat.  It  is  easier  to lay
blame for conditions of oppression  than  to address them. It is easier  to point
to adoption  as the problem,  than  to focus  on  the reality of poor birth moth-
ers  and  their  children  and  to  think  seriously  about  how  to  improve  their
lives. And  it is certainly  easier  to restrict or even eliminate  adoption, than  to
correct  the problems  of social  injustice and economic  disadvantage.
Adoption cannot solve society's problems  in any global sense.  But it can
enable  a  significant  number  of birth  mothers  and  children  to  live  infinitely
better  lives than they would  otherwise.  It also  can open our eyes  to  a differ-
ent vision  of family  and community-one  in which we  see children  in need
as  belonging  to  all of  us  in  the sense  that we  feel  a  responsibility  for  their
care.
We need  to  reshape  adoption  politics  so that we  can  begin  to reshape
adoption  policies. We  need  to make  others  understand  that to be for  adop-
tion  is  consistent  with-and  not in  conflict  with-attempts  to remedy  social
injustice.
And, if we want  to  effect any real change, we  need to get organizations
involved  on  the  pro-adoption  side.  Real  adoption  reform  will  not  happen
simply  because  some  of us  care  as  individuals  and are  committed  to using
our  energies  to  press  for  change.  It will  happen  only if we  have  organiza-
tions  that  are  capable  of  fighting  effectively  for  change.  A  major  problem
now  is  that  there  is  no significant  organizational  support  for needed  adop-
tion  reform.  So, we  have  to change  the thinking in  existing  organizations  or
create  new ones.
I  will  end  with  a  challenge-a  challenge  to  those  of  you  who  agree
with these goals-to  come  up  with ideas  in the course  of this conference  as
to  how we  can move forward  to accomplish  true adoption reform.
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